Abstract
Introduction
Scheduling tasks in a distributed computing system is one of the most challenging problems that need to be solved when running applications. By efficiently scheduling the tasks the performance and the efficiency of the system is improved. The task scheduling problem takes many forms depending on the characteristics of the tasks to be scheduled, the characteristics of the machines comprising the system and the objective function that needs to be optimized. One type of scheduling problem is the one in which there are no dependencies between tasks and the tasks can be of arbitrary size. This is the case for several applications in science and engineering in which the total load can be split into an arbitrary number of independent loads. These loads require the same type of processing and can be assigned to any computer in the system. In practice it corresponds to the widely used master-slave model of parallel computation. The above scheduling problem can be characterized using the divisible load model which was studied extensively in recent years resulting in a cohesive theory called Divisible Load Theory (DLT). Divisible load theory provides analytical results and optimal algorithms for scheduling loads on various types of platforms such as bus, tree, star and linear networks [5] .
The scheduling algorithms developed within DLT assume that the participants (in this case, processors) are obedient. Thus, they report to the scheduler the true parameters of their processing facilities (e.g. processing power). The scheduler makes the allocation decision according to the values reported by the processors or by the owners of these processors. This assumption is not valid in real life situations where these participants have no a-priori motivation for cooperation and they are tempted to manipulate the scheduling algorithm if it is beneficial to do so. This behavior may lead to poor system performance and inefficiency. Thus, we need to develop new algorithms and protocols that address the self interest of the participants. Unlike the traditional DLT algorithms, the new protocols must deal with the possible manipulations. Also, the system must provide incentives to agents to participate in the given algorithm. The solution of these kinds of problems comes from economics, more precisely from mechanism design theory [18] . The scope of this theory is to provide tools and methods to design protocols for self interested agents. Of interest are the so called strategyproof mechanisms in which the participants maximize their own utilities only if they report their true parameters and follow the given algorithm. In a general mechanism each participant has a privately known function called valuation which quantifies the agent's benefit or loss. Payments are designed and used to motivate the participants to report their true valuations. The goal of each participant is to maximize the sum of her valuation and payment. As an example consider several resource providers that offer computer services. We assume that each resource is characterized by its job processing rate. An allocation mechanism is strategyproof if a resource owner maximizes her utility only by reporting the true resource processing rate to the mechanism. The optimal utility is independent of the values reported by the other participating processors.
In this paper we consider the design of strategyproof scheduling mechanisms in the context of divisible load theory. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to augment DLT with incentives. We develop a strategyproof mechanism that provides incentives to the processors to participate and report their true processing capabilities to the scheduler. The processors gain the maximum profit by executing the task only if they are truthfully reporting the private values characterizing their processing capabilities.
Related work. The divisible load scheduling problem was studied extensively in recent years resulting in a cohesive theory called Divisible Load Theory. A reference book on DLT is [5] . Two recent surveys on DLT are [6] and [19] . This theory has been used for scheduling loads on heterogeneous distributed systems in the context of different applications such as image processing [13] , databases [7] , linear algebra [8] , and multimedia broadcasting [4] . Scheduling divisible loads in grids has been investigated in [22] .
New results and open research problems in DLT are presented in [3] . All these works assumed that the participants in the load scheduling algorithms are obedient and follow the algorithm. Recently, several researchers considered the mechanism design theory to solve several computational problems that involve self interested participants. These problems include resource allocation and task scheduling [16, 20, 21] , routing [9] and multicast transmission [10] . In their seminal paper, Nisan and Ronen [17] considered for the first time the mechanism design problem in a computational setting. They proposed and studied a VCG(VickreyClarke-Groves) type mechanism for the shortest path in graphs where edges belong to self interested agents. They also provided a mechanism for solving the task scheduling on unrelated machines problem. A general framework for designing strategyproof mechanisms for one parameter agent was proposed by Archer and Tardos [1] . They developed a general method to design strategyproof mechanisms for optimization problems that have general objective functions and restricted form for valuations. In a subsequent paper [2] the same authors investigated the frugality of shortest path mechanisms. Grosu and Chronopoulos [12] derived a strategyproof mechanism that gives the overall optimal solution for the static load balancing problem in distributed systems. The results and the challenges of designing distributed mechanisms are surveyed in [11] . The strategyproof computing paradigm proposed in [14] considers the self-interest and incentives of participants in distributed computing systems. Ng et al. [15] proposed a strategyproof system for dynamic resource allocation in data staging.
Our contributions. The main contribution of this paper is to show how existing divisible load theory can be augmented with incentives. We develop a strategyproof mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in distributed systems assuming a bus type interconnection and a linear cost model for the processors. We define the mechanism and prove its properties. We simulate and study the implementation of the mechanism on systems characterized by different parameters.
Organization. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present a description of the divisible load scheduling problem. In Section 3 we present the framework used to design our mechanism. In Section 4 we present and discuss the proposed strategyproof mechanism. In Section 5 we study by simulation the proposed scheduling mechanism. In Section 6 we draw conclusions and present future directions.
Divisible Load Scheduling Problem
We consider a distributed system with a bus interconnection and a master processor. The set of processors is where is the master processor. Each processor , , is characterized by , the time taken by to process a unit load. The fraction of load assigned to processor is . The amount of time in which executes its assigned load is given by . This corresponds to a linear cost model for the processors. To transfer units of load from the master to takes units of time, where is the time to communicate a unit load from to any other processor. We assume that the master has no processing capability and it can communicate with a single processor at a given time (i.e. we assume the one-port model). We denote by the finish time of processor , defined as the time required to send load from to plus the time of processing the load at . In Fig. 1 we present a diagram showing the execution on this system.
The scheduling problem denoted as BUS-LINEAR is to determine the load allocation which minimizes the total execution time (or makespan)
. The finish time of processor is denoted by and is given by:
(
The BUS-LINEAR problem can be formally described as follows: subject to the constraints:
The following theorems proved in [5] characterize the optimal solution. Theorem 2.1. The optimal solution for the BUS-LINEAR problem is obtained when all processors participate and they all finish executing their assigned load at the same time, i.e. .
Theorem 2.2.
Any load allocation order is optimal for the BUS-LINEAR problem.
The following algorithm solves the BUS-LINEAR problem:
BUS-LINEAR Algorithm
Input: Time to process a unit load: , , ; Time to communicate a unit load: ; Output: Load fractions: , , ; 1. for do 2.
for do
The algorithm is executed by the master processor when a new load needs to be processed. In order to compute the allocation requires information about the network and about the processing capabilities. The processors are assumed to report their true processing times for one unit load to the master. This may not happen if the processors are owned and managed by different entities or agents. They may report different values in order to gain profit. In the next sections we present the design of a mechanism that gives incentive to the agents to report their true processing capabilities.
Mechanism Design Framework
In this section we introduce the main concepts of mechanism design theory. We limit our description to mechanism design problems for one parameter agents. In this type of mechanism design problems each agent has some private data represented by a single real valued parameter [17] . In the following we define such problem.
A mechanism design problem for one parameter agents is characterized by:
(i) A finite set of allowed outputs. The output is a vector , , computed according to the agents' bids, . Here, is the value (bid) reported by agent to the mechanism.
(ii) Each agent , ( ), has a privately known parameter called the true value and a publicly known parameter called the execution value. The preferences of agent are given by a function called valuation .
(iii) Each agent goal is to maximize its utility. The utility of agent is , where is the payment handed by the mechanism to agent and is the vector of execution values. The payments are handed to agents after the mechanism knows , .
(iv) The goal of the mechanism is to select an output that optimizes a given cost function .
Definition 3.1. (Mechanism)
A mechanism with verification is characterized by two functions:
(i) The output function . This function has as input the vector of agents' bids and returns an output .
(ii) The payment function , where is the payment handed by the mechanism to agent .
Notation: In the rest of the paper we denote by the vector of bids not including the bid of agent . The vector is represented as .
Definition 3.2. (Strategyproof mechanism)
A mechanism is called strategyproof if for every agent of type and for every bids of the other agents, the agent's utility is maximized when she declares her real type (i.e. truthtelling is a dominant strategy).
A desirable property of a mechanism is that the utility of a truthful agent is always non-negative. The agents hope for a profit by participating in the mechanism.
Definition 3.3. (Voluntary participation mechanism)
We say that a mechanism satisfies the voluntary participation condition if for every agent , true values , and other agents' bids (i.e. truthful agents never incur a loss).
The proposed mechanism
Each processor (agent) participating in the mechanism is characterized by the true value which is equal to the time to process a unit load, i.e.
. Only knows . We denote by the vector of 'true' unit load processing times of the processors ( . The mechanism asks each to report its value (the time to process a unit load). The processors may not report the true value. After all the processors report their values the mechanism computes an output function (i.e. the loads assigned to computers), , ( ) according to the processors' bids such that the makespan is minimized. A processor may choose to process the load allocated to it at a different processing rate given by its execution value , where . Thus, processor may process the assigned load at a slower rate than its true processing rate. The goal of a strategyproof mechanism with verification is to give incentives to agents such that it is beneficial for them to report their true values and process the assigned loads using their full processing capacity. After the loads are processed, the execution value for every processor is known to the mechanism. Once the mechanism knows the execution values it computes and hands a payment to each processor . All processors know the mechanism and the algorithm used to compute the output function (allocation). We assume an arbitrary order on the set of processors, which will not affect the optimality of allocation (according to Theorem 2.2).
Processor 's ( ) valuation is defined as:
which is equivalent to the negation of 's actual time required to process load . The greater the processing time, the smaller the valuation. This can be considered to be the cost incurred by in processing . We assume that each processor wants to choose its strategy (what value to report) such that its utility is maximized. The utility for each processor is defined as the payment received from the mechanism plus the valuation determined by the load allocated to it:
The goal is to design a strategyproof mechanism that minimizes the makespan of the system composed of the processors. This involves finding an allocation algorithm and a payment scheme that minimizes the makespan according to the processors' bids and motivates all the processors to bid their true values and process the load at their full processing capacity (i.e.
). For our mechanism we use the optimal allocation algorithm described in Section 2. Using this algorithm and the method presented in [17] we designed a strategyproof mechanism with verification that minimizes the makespan. In the following we define the mechanism.
Definition 4.1. (DLS-BL Mechanism)
The DLS-BL mechanism is defined by the following two functions:
(i) The allocation function given by the BUS-LINEAR algorithm.
(ii) The payment function given by:
where the function is called the compensation function for processor ; and the function is called the bonus for processor . The function is the optimal total execution time when processor is not used in the allocation. Thus, the bonus for a processor is equal to its contribution in reducing the total execution time.
For our scheduling mechanism we can state the following theorems.
Theorem 4.1. (Strategyproofness)
The DLS-BL mechanism is strategyproof.
Proof. Assuming a vector of bids , the utility of processor is:
We consider two possible situations: (i) i.e. processor processes its assigned load using its full processing capability.
If processor bids its true value then its utility is:
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We want to show that , which reduces to show that . Because is the minimum possible value for the processing time (from the optimality of BUS-LINEAR algorithm), by bidding a lower value, processor gets more load and the total execution time is increased, thus . If processor bids higher ( ) then its utility is: (11) By bidding a higher value processor gets less load and thus more load will be assigned to the other processors. Due to the optimality of allocation the total execution time increases i.e. and thus we have . (ii) i.e. processor processes its assigned load at a slower rate thus increasing the total execution time. A similar argument as in case i) applies.
A desirable property of a mechanism is that the profit of a truthful agent is always non-negative. This means the agents hope for a profit by participating in the mechanism.
Theorem 4.2. (Voluntary participation)
The DLS-BL mechanism satisfies the voluntary participation condition.
Proof. The utility of processor when it bids its true value is:
The total execution time is obtained by using all the other processors except processor . By allocating the same amount of load, we get a higher execution time than in the case of using all the processors, with processor bidding its true value (from the optimality of allocation). Thus .
We obtained a strategyproof scheduling mechanism that satisfies the voluntary participation condition. Because the optimal algorithm assumes a central dispatcher (master), the mechanism will be implemented in a centralized way as part of the master's code. The protocol assumes the existence of a payment infrastructure. In the following we present the protocol that implements the DLS-BL mechanism.
Protocol DLS-BL:
1. After the master processor collects all the bids it computes the allocation using the BUS-LINEAR algorithm.
2. Once the assigned load is finished the Master processor does the following:
2.1. Determines the execution values for each processor, .
Computes the payments
for each processor using equation (7). 2.3. Sends to each .
3. Each processor receives its payment and evaluates its profit.
Processors will obtain the maximum profit only when they report the true value of their processing time.
Experimental results
In this section we study by simulation the proposed strategyproof scheduling mechanism. We consider two distributed systems composed of sixteen processors ( ) and one master processor ( ). The first system, called the 'fast' system, has a fast with . The second system, called the 'slow' system, has a slow with . The times to process a unit load , are presented in Table 1 . For both systems we assume that only cheats by reporting values different than its true processing time and by processing the load at a different rate than the true rate. The time to communicate a unit load from to any other processor is for both systems. The low communication latency ensures that the system is computationally bound. If is equal in magnitude or larger than the time to process a unit load at the fast processors, the system becomes communication bound, resulting in fewer processors performing work and negligible bonuses.
For each system, we examine eight cases:
(1) (i.e., bids truthfully and it processes the load as reported); (2) (i.e., bids truthfully, but processes the load at a slower rate); (3) (i.e., bids a rate slower than its true rate, but processes the load at the reported rate); (4) (i.e., bids a rate slower than its true rate, but it processes the load at its true rate); (5) (i.e., processes its load slower than its true rate and bids a rate slower than its execution rate); (6) (i.e., processes the load slower than it bid and bids a rate slower than its true rate); (7) (i.e., bids a rate faster than its true rate, but processes the load at its true rate); (8) (i.e., bids a rate faster than its true rate and processes the load slower than its true rate).
The bid and the execution value for each case are presented in Table 2 (fast system) and Table 3 (slow system). Figure 2 and 3 show the makespan ( ) for the eight cases and the two types of systems, fast and slow. Notice that case (1) ( ) results in the minimum makespan, while all other cases result in larger makespan. When (cases (3), (4), and (5)), the makespan is increased by a small amount ( for the slow system and for the fast system) as the load allocated to is reduced and the load allocated to the other processors is increased. The impact is larger if the number of processors is reduced as there are fewer processors to distribute the load. In the remaining cases ( ), the system performance dramatically degrades as is overloaded and the other processors are underutilized. In these cases, is the processor which is slowing down the entire system. The increase in makespan is large (between and ) and it is due to the impact of . Comparing the fast system with the slow system, we notice that the performance degradation is greater for the fast system even though the relative rate change is similar or smaller than that for the slow system. This is because BUS-LINEAR algorithm allocates more work to faster processors than to slower processors.
The relationship between 's utility and payment versus the eight cases for the fast and slow system is depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. As expected, case (1) ( ) results in the greatest which means that when is not cheating it gets the maximum utility. In all the other cases obtains a lower . When (cases (2), (6), (7) , and (8)), the utility is negative due to the impact of on the makespan. In these cases, as . In the remain- ing cases, and thus is reduced as is smaller than in the optimal case. As anticipated, the utility of is much greater for the fast system than for the slow system, due to larger allocations to faster processors. Figure 6 and 7 show the utility for all processors and all cases for the two types of systems we considered. When (cases (3), (4), (5), and (6)), (for ) is increased resulting in greater . For example is increased by in the fast system and by in the slow system. When (cases (7) and (8)), the reduced results in decreased . For example is decreased by in the fast system and by in the slow system. In the remaining cases, and are unchanged as . The impact of is felt unevenly among the processors. The effects of cheating diminishes as the processor index increases. For example in the case of the fast system and cases (3), (4), (5) , and (6), the increase in is while the increase in is . This behavior is due to the allocation computed by the scheduling algorithm.
Conclusion
In this paper we considered the design of strategyproof scheduling mechanisms in the context of divisible load theory. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to augment DLT with incentives. We developed a strategyproof mechanism that provides incentives to the processors to participate and report their true processing capabilities to the scheduler. The processors gain the maximum profit by executing the load only if they are truthfully reporting their private values characterizing their processing capabilities. We proved and studied the properties of the mechanism. We performed an extensive simulation study in order to show the properties of our mechanism. Future work include the development Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Computing (ISPDC'05) of distributed mechanisms for task scheduling and also the study of agents' privacy in these mechanisms.
